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Climate Change and Weather-related Disasters:
What Role for Insurance, Reinsurance and Financial
Sectors?
Alberto Monti*
ABSTRACT
The adverse impacts associated with extreme weather events have
increased over the last few decades, and this appears to be due to several
factors, including climate change and global warming, the growth of urban
development and population density in exposed areas, and a higher
concentration of assets and values at risk. The growing impact of the direct
and indirect costs associated with weather-related disasters worldwide calls
for an evaluation of possible strategies to reduce their large-scale damaging
effects. The design and implementation of effective financial management
strategies to deal with the increasing costs arising out of extreme weather
events require a proactive role of governments in direct and continuous
collaboration with the private sector. This paper discusses possible roles of
insurance, reinsurance and financial sector participants from a public policy
perspective, with a view to understanding how they can contribute to the
achievement of designated policy goals.

1. Introduction
As evidenced by recent dramatic events, the frequency and severity of
extreme weather phenomena, such as droughts, floods and associated
landslides, storms, tropical cyclones, ocean and coastal surges, heat waves,
forest fires and cold snaps, have increased over the last few decades.
Escalating impacts associated with these events appear to be due to several
factors, including climate change and global warming, the growth of urban
development and population density in exposed areas, and a higher
concentration of assets and values at risk.
While the ongoing effects of global warming on climate extremes is
debated in the scientific community,1 a few things seem relatively clear:

*

Professor of Law, Bocconi University, School of Law, Italy.

1. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], A Report of Working
Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. (Susan Solomon et al. eds.,
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rising sea levels increase the risk of storm surges thereby increasing the
exposure and vulnerability of assets located in coastal areas; increasing land
and air temperatures exacerbate the risk of wild fires and drought and pose
serious health risks for the population; and changing patterns of
precipitation aggravate the risk of winter storms and floods.2
The growing impact of the direct and indirect costs associated with
weather-related disasters worldwide3 calls for an evaluation of possible
strategies to reduce their large-scale damaging effects.4 In this respect, the
design and implementation of effective financial management strategies to
deal with the increasing costs arising out of extreme weather events require
governments to take a proactive role in direct and continuous collaboration
with the private financial sector.
This paper discusses possible roles of insurance, reinsurance and
financial sector participants from a public policy perspective, with a view to
understanding how they can contribute to the achievement of designated
policy goals.

2. Financial Management of Weather-Related Disasters:
A Public Policy Perspective
From a public policy viewpoint, the rising costs associated with
extreme weather events pose serious challenges to governments worldwide.
The main issues in this field have been recently identified and addressed by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).5 The

Cambridge University Press 2007) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/; see also HARTMUT
GRABL ET AL., WEATHER CATASTROPHES AND CLIMATE CHANGE – IS THERE STILL HOPE FOR US?
(Munich Re’s Geo Risks Research 2005).
2. Lloyd’s, 360 Risk Project, in CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT (Lloyd’s 2006), available at
http://www.lloyds.com/NewsCentre/360_risk_project/ The_debate_onclimatechange/. See
also U.N. Envtl. Programme Fin. Initiative [UNEP FI], Adaptation and Vulnerability to Climate
Change: The Role of the Finance Sector (Nov. 2006), available at http://www. unepfi.org/.
3. The increases in disaster losses due to natural catastrophes primarily result
from weather related events, in particular windstorms events and floods. See, e.g.,
MUNICH RE, TOPICS GEO NATURAL CATASTROPHES 2007 (Munich Re 2008); SWISS RE, SIGMA
NO. 1/2008, NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND MAN-MADE DISASTERS IN 2007 (Swiss
Reinsurance Co. 2008). See also MUNICH RE, TOPICS GEO NATURAL CATASTROPHES 2006
(Munich Re 2007); SWISS RE, SIGMA NO. 2/2007, NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND MAN-MADE
DISASTERS IN 2006 (Swiss Reinsurance Co. 2007).
4. See CLIMATE EXTREMES AND SOCIETY (Henry F. Diaz & Richard J. Murnane eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2008).
5. Established in 1961, the OECD is an intergovernmental organization based
in Paris. The OECD brings together the governments of countries committed to
democracy and the market economy from around the world to: support sustainable
152
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OECD, in the context of a broader project focusing on the financial
management of large-scale catastrophes (natural and man-made),
established the OECD International Network to promote the exchange of
information and experiences among policymakers, industry, and academia
in OECD and non-member countries, and provide state-of-the-art expertise
and policy advice.6
Key public policy questions include: Are governments in developed
and emerging countries adopting efficient strategies to manage the
increasing financial burden of catastrophes? What are the roles and
responsibilities of key stakeholders in the public and private sectors in the
management of disaster risks and costs? How best to prepare for the
unprecedented challenges posed by large-scale risks?
Under the auspices of this project, the OECD just completed a survey
and comparative review of different policy strategies and approaches with
respect to the prevention, mitigation, and financial compensation of largescale catastrophes in selected OECD and non-member countries. The
comparative review focuses, in particular, on the approaches adopted by
governments regarding financial coverage against disaster risks, and the
respective roles of the public and private sectors in providing compensation
and incentives to reduce the risk of catastrophic losses.7
The public sector is directly concerned with this issue and these
questions for several reasons. First, the increasing financial impact of
weather-related disasters on individuals and businesses may be significant,
which could lead to large welfare losses and have broad macroeconomic
consequences. Second, public assets, including buildings and
infrastructures, are exposed to extreme climate risk and whose destruction
or impairment may have economic impacts. Finally, in the aftermath of a
catastrophe, the public authority will likely be under strong political
pressure – or sometimes even under a legal duty – to provide compensation
to victims. In light of the above, the availability of financial compensation

economic growth; boost employment; raise living standards; maintain financial
stability; assist other countries’ economic development; and contribute to growth in
world trade. The OECD also shares expertise and exchanges views with more than
100 other countries and economies, from Brazil, China, and Russia to the least
developed countries in Africa, http://www.oecd.org.
6. See http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/catrisks; ALBERTO MONTI, Financial Management
of Large Scale Catastrophes, CATASTROPHE RISK MANAGEMENT, 20 (September 2006);
ALBERTO MONTI, Managing and Financing Large Scale Risks in OECD Countries. Challenges and
Institutional Solutions, INS. REG. & DEV. AUTHORITY J., vol. V, n.5, 13 (April 2007).
7. See ALBERTO MONTI, Policy Approaches to the Financial Management of Large-Scale
Disasters, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF LARGE-SCALE CATASTROPHES’, POL’Y ISSUES IN INS. N.12,
11-142 (OECD Publishing) (2008).
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and risk transfer tools ex ante can enhance economic efficiency and
performance.
Many OECD countries have developed policies focused on the
financial management of large-scale disaster risks with common goals of
reducing the negative impact of disaster losses on the population and
economy and facilitating and improving relief, rehabilitation and
reconstruction efforts.
In several OECD countries, moreover, policy
objectives in this area expressly include the enhancement of disaster risk
prevention, reduction, mitigation, adaptation and response strategies, and
the reduction of government exposure to catastrophe risk. The long term
goals of these policies are to minimize the total cost of disasters (i.e., the
sum of disaster losses, the cost of preventive/mitigation measures and
transaction costs) and build disaster-resilient societies. To implement such
policies and to achieve the stated objectives, governments have employed a
wide array of different policy tools and pursued different strategies.
In the aftermath of a catastrophe, governments in all OECD countries
regularly provide some degree of post-disaster assistance and aid to the
population. Emergency rescue and relief efforts are generally acknowledged
to be part of the responsibilities of a State to its citizens. Such efforts are
aimed at saving lives and providing temporary assistance to the population
hit by a disaster event, and the costs of such measures are usually financed
through the payment of taxes. In certain countries, emergency relief costs
and sometimes also government exposures to public assets and critical
infrastructure disaster losses are funded by dedicated catastrophe reserve
funds, occasionally supplemented by market-based risk transfer tools.8
In terms of reconstruction costs and compensation of property
damages and economic losses suffered by those affected by a disaster, the
situation differs across jurisdictions. In some states the government directly
provides, to a greater or lesser extent, compensation to property owners ex
post by means of either permanent structural arrangements (such as
compensation funds) or ad hoc disbursement of public funds on a
discretionary basis.9
In a number of countries, pursuant to the principle of solidarity – often
recognized at the constitutional level – the mutualisation of losses arising
out of a disaster event is perceived as a fundamental right of the citizens,
and the role of the government in the compensation phase is, therefore,
considered essential. This is the case, for instance, in Belgium, France, Italy
and Spain.

8. This is the case, for instance, of Mexico.8. See ALBERTO MONTI, Policy Approaches to
the Financial Management of Large-Scale Disasters, FIN. MGMT. OF LARGE-SCALE CATASTROPHES,
POL’Y ISSUES IN INS. N.12, 11-143 (OECD Publishing) (2008).
9. See Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes. A Comparative Legal Approach,
TORT AND INS. LAW VOL. 14 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., Springer 2006).
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In other countries, the protection of private property against disaster
risks is to a large extent left to the initiative of the owners (i.e., businesses
and individuals), with a view to highlighting individual responsibilities,
minimizing moral hazard, and providing incentives to invest in cost-effective
risk prevention and mitigation measures. In this respect, private insurance
often plays an important role in the coverage of property damages and
economic losses caused by large-scale events,10 but the level of disaster
insurance penetration, as well as the actual terms and conditions of
coverage, vary significantly across domestic markets.
In response to the peculiar insurability problems posed by
catastrophic risks – such as the geographical and inter-temporal risk
spreading issues and the high cost of capital to cover low-probability/high
consequence risks – and in the context of country-specific disaster risks and
other possible national factors, some OECD governments have entered into
partnerships with the private insurance sector with the policy objective of
making disaster insurance available to the general public at affordable rates
and/or ensuring that private assets exposed to risk are duly covered by
insurance. To this end, special institutional arrangements aimed at the
explicit coordination of public and private actions have been set up to deal
with losses caused by different catastrophic perils, including extreme
weather phenomena, other natural catastrophes (e.g., earthquakes),
accidental manmade disasters (e.g., industrial and technological accidents),
and terrorist attacks.
Public sector participation in these explicit coordination schemes has
often entailed one or more of the following: (a) the introduction of a
mandatory or quasi-mandatory disaster insurance regime – to provide
sufficient risk pooling and reduce the potential impact of adverse selection –
and the provision of the necessary supporting legal and regulatory
framework; (b) the provision of reinsurance arrangements, dedicated lending
facilities, or other form of State guarantee, to limit private sector exposure in
case of catastrophic losses and reduce the cost of capital to cover lowprobability/high-consequence events; and (c) the creation of the basic
preconditions for the private insurance market to work properly (e.g.,
regulations and measures concerning preventive and mitigation measures,
land use, mandatory building codes, and emergency planning).
Generally, coping with issues related to natural catastrophes has led to
the development of different policy approaches and institutional models
where preventive and mitigation measures are accompanied by the
implementation of specific public or private insurance coverage systems and
other instruments. The design and implementation of a sound strategy to

10. See COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES ASSURANCES [CEA], REDUCING THE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATURAL CATASTROPHES (CEA 2007) available at
http://www.cea.eu/.
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manage the increasing financial burden of large-scale disaster costs at a
country or regional level require, in fact, a coordinated and integrated
approach, entailing several steps and involving all relevant stakeholders.
In this respect, it is worth noting that a proper technical understanding
of the underlying risks, including risk differentials across regions, is a
prerequisite for establishing a sound technical basis for financial
arrangements and making them sustainable in the long run. Uncertainties
associated with climate change do not facilitate the accomplishment of this
task, since historical data on past events and losses are not sufficient to
properly assess future probabilities.
In any case, once the relevant hazards, risks, vulnerabilities and
exposures have been assessed, the expected financial burden of future
disasters can be alleviated by the adoption of cost-effective risk prevention,
reduction, mitigation, and response measures.11 Such measures, however,
cannot completely eliminate the direct and indirect costs of weather-related
calamities.
To cover the economic costs of natural disasters, some countries have
devised a framework of contingency measures either by way of establishing
special government disaster funds or by promoting catastrophe insurance
coverage, whereas other countries have decided to deal with the issue of
emergency assistance and compensation for disaster losses on a purely ex
post, ad hoc basis, with a minimal or non-existent level of ex ante commitment
of financial resources.
The level of ad hoc, ex post government intervention for the
compensation of losses due to natural disasters varies significantly across
OECD countries. Some countries rely almost exclusively on an ex post
approach. In Italy, for instance, ad hoc, ex post compensation of disaster losses
by the State is the rule, with limited or no involvement of the private
insurance sector. Other countries use ad hoc, ex post compensation as a
complement to other funding mechanisms, such as structural catastrophe
funds or disaster insurance.
The opportunity to develop an ex ante strategy for the financial
management of large-scale catastrophes is generally suggested by the
observation that purely ex post approaches to the compensation of disaster
losses may have several limitations. In many cases, ex post, ad hoc funding is
cost-ineffective and untargeted. Delivery of compensation is often too slow
and, if the hazard risk exposures are significant, the fiscal burden may be
unsustainable for the public authorities in the long run. Moreover, ex post
allocation of public funds to meet critical needs may divert resources from

11. See U.N. secretariat of the Int’l Strategy for Disaster Reduction [UN/ISDR],
Words Into Action: A Guide for Implementing the Hyogo Framework (Apr. 30, 2007); UN/ISDR,
Indicators of Progress: Guidance on Measuring the Reduction of Disaster Risks and the
Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (U.N. Jan. 2008).
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other projects, and critical decisions have to be made under political
pressure. Furthermore, ad hoc compensation likely entails inequalities in
treatment and discontent. Finally, even if the matter is not straightforward,
ad hoc, ex post compensation mechanisms may also entail moral hazard,
reducing the incentive to take precautions ex ante and increasing the total
cost of disasters.
Possible ex ante solutions include the establishment of dedicated
catastrophe funds, market-based or state-sponsored disaster insurance and
reinsurance programs, alternative risk transfer (ART) and alternative risk
financing (ARF) tools – such as risk securitization and contingent capital
arrangements – allowing broader risk spreading through capital markets.
The establishment of dedicated catastrophe reserve funds, with special
appropriations in the public budget or prior legislated spending authorities,
requires some degree of ex ante financial planning and a commitment of
public money to cover emergency relief costs and, sometimes, post-disaster
reconstruction costs. Since rules on the use of such funds in case of a
disaster are established ex ante, money can be disbursed promptly and a
relatively consistent treatment of similar situations is ensured across time.
Such rules may also limit moral hazard by limiting the scope of government
compensation (e.g., strictly defining eligible damages and placing a cap on
the level of public assistance).
In Hungary, for instance, the Fund for Flood and Inland Water
Compensation (Wesselényi Miklós) regulates the compensation of flood
damages. Individuals who own real property in risky regions of Hungary pay
contributions to the Fund and, based on these contributions, are entitled to
indemnification in the case of loss. The Fund is co-financed by government
budgetary support if it lacks enough resources to fulfill its obligations. Along
the same lines, in Austria, the Catastrophes Fund covers parts of the
damages caused by natural disasters and further help is provided by special
laws enacted on an ad hoc basis. Similarly, limited ex post compensation is
available in Poland through various dedicated funds and budget allocations.
In Mexico, the Natural Disasters’ Fund (FONDEN), created by the federal
government, provides support, in a complementary manner and within the
limits of its resources, in case of emergency and natural disaster situations.
Public catastrophe reserve funds may not be economically or
politically viable to finance the expected costs of low probability disaster
events, such as events with a return period of 100 years or more, due to the
extremely long time horizon. Moreover, if catastrophe funds are aimed at
covering not only emergency relief costs and public infrastructure losses,
but also damage to private property owned by businesses and individuals,
moral hazard may arise, and the incentive to take precautions could become
very low, particularly if the catastrophe funds are not well-designed or if the
rules governing these funds are not perceived to be credible.
In many OECD member countries, there is some degree of
coordination (sometimes explicit – for example, in the form of institutional
157
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arrangements) among stakeholders for the prevention, mitigation, and
coverage of future potential losses caused by large-scale disasters. In the
context of such coordination schemes, particularly those institutional in
character, insurance and reinsurance sector participants, capital markets,
and public authorities have a defined role to play. These solutions are not
necessarily public-private partnerships (PPP) arrangements per se (a PPP is a
voluntary association of both public and private actors seeking to address
common goals through shared resources and skills), but are nevertheless
based on some level of mutual understanding of disaster risk exposures and
broad assumptions regarding the respective roles played by the public and
private sectors.
The aim of such coordination is mainly to orchestrate the efforts of the
various stakeholders involved by setting up a clear framework for action.
Coordination may take place spontaneously, when economic actors
recognize that cooperative behavior serves the interests of all parties
involved. Spontaneous coordination between the private and the public
sectors generates an implicit partnership. In the United Kingdom, for
instance, insurance coverage against flood damage has been a standard
feature of household policies since the early 1960s and the British insurance
industry was able to make this commitment to its customers on the
understanding that the UK government would provide effective flood
defenses.
With implicit partnerships, the coordination between public and
private sectors (and other stakeholders for that matter) is subject to a
degree of uncertainty and may lead to opportunistic behavior. Explicit
partnerships – in the form of institutional arrangements where risks, duties
and responsibilities are clearly allocated among the various participants –
may facilitate more stable and reliable coordination efforts. With explicit
arrangements, there is a basic understanding among all stakeholders
regarding the allocation of responsibilities for the taking of precautions, as
well as responsibilities for the assumption of risks and losses. It should be
noted that this does not necessarily require the State to take charge of the
compensation of disaster losses or provide a financial commitment in
support of private insurance; what is important is that mutualization options
for protecting against catastrophic losses are clearly understood and
debated before a major disaster. Individuals, businesses, central and local
authorities will then be aware of the expected roles played by different
stakeholders in dealing with large-scale disasters and of their expected
financial exposures.

3. The Role of Insurance, Reinsurance and Financial Sectors
In OECD countries, insurance coverage plays an important role in the
financial management of large-scale natural disasters. In several countries,
including Belgium, France, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland, for instance,
158
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where inclusion of natural disaster risks in fire and/or other property
insurance policies is mandated, most natural disaster losses incurred by
households and businesses are covered ex ante by insurance companies.
Likewise, flood risks in the United Kingdom are largely covered by the
private insurance market.12
Climate change, however, poses serious threats for the insurance and
reinsurance sectors worldwide. The increased frequency and severity of
extreme climatic events entail a growing exposure of insurance and
reinsurance companies across different lines of business including property,
business interruption, life, health and liability. From an insurance viewpoint,
the ongoing change in intensity and distribution of extreme weather events
creates uncertainty and requires constant monitoring and adaptation of
underwriting standards.
The threat of a mega-disaster striking a major inhabited area, for
instance, has dramatically altered the insurance environment. Today many
insurers and reinsurers indicate that they cannot continue to provide the
same level of coverage against hurricanes and floods without incurring an
excessive risk of insolvency or substantial losses of capital or surplus. These
concerns stem from a balanced reassessment of the insurance industry’s
financial exposures following recent heavy losses.
The insurance market depends on the ability to pool homogeneous
but uncorrelated risks faced by a large number of policyholders. When a
large number of uncorrelated risks are pooled, insurance companies can
predict with considerably greater certainty the average occurrence of a
particular insured event, and thus can efficiently provide financial coverage
based on the reduction of uncertainty. The ability of pooled risks to reduce
uncertainty diminishes when the risks of policyholders are correlated, as in
the case of disaster risks.13
A related problem with disaster insurance concerns the ability of the
traditional insurance mechanism to properly manage low probability and
high consequence (LPHC) events, such as major natural catastrophes. The
insurance and reinsurance capacity for large-scale risks is ultimately limited

12. See ALBERTO MONTI, Policy Approaches to the Financial Management of Large-Scale
Disasters, 12 POL’Y ISSUES IN INS., 11-142 (2008).
13. See, e.g., 8 POL’Y ISSUES IN INS. (2005) (in particular Part I Insurability of
Catastrophic Risks). See also John R. Coomber, Natural and Large Scale Catastrophes –
Changing Risk Characteristics and Challenges to the Insurance Industry, 31 THE GENEVA PAPERS
ON RISK & INS. ISSUES 88-95 (2006); Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Markets Under
Stress: The Case of Extreme Event Insurance, in ECONOMICS FOR AN IMPERFECT WORLD: ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ’ (Richard Arnott et al. eds., MIT Press 2003); Kenneth A.
Froot, The Market for Catastrophe Risk: A Clinical Examination, 60 J. OF FIN. ECON. 529-71
(2001); M.G. Faure, The Limits to Insurability from a Law and Economics Perspective, THE
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. ISSUES 454-62 (1995).
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and the financial management of such risks may be quite costly for the
industry, mainly due to the sheer magnitude of potential insured losses (i.e.,
the size of aggregate claims in case of a disaster) and the inter-temporal
mismatch between the size of annual premiums and the size of the annual
expected losses.
The risks of losses from weather-related catastrophes can be correlated
both temporally and spatially, and this creates the above mentioned
geographical and inter-temporal risk spreading problems. The accumulation
of risk can be quite high in the primary market, since the same catastrophic
event can cause losses involving many different insured properties and
infrastructures at the same time, giving rise to potentially immense claims
burdens in a single policy period. International reinsurance and the possible
bundling of different perils may address this issue.
A further problem concerns the lower level of predictability of certain
catastrophic risks relative to other insurance risks. Until recent years, there
has been a general lack of reliable data and objective information
concerning the economic effects of natural disasters. Considerable
uncertainty is associated with the estimation of the probability of disasters
of different magnitudes occurring and the size of the resulting losses.
Technology and computer modelling of natural perils have only recently
reached the point where such risks can be clarified. Climate change poses
new challenges assessing these weather-related risks.
Finally, on the demand side, it has been demonstrated that the
bounded rationality of most individuals may lead them to underestimate or
ignore LPHC risks. Even a reasonably priced catastrophe insurance
coverage, therefore, may often be perceived by prospective policyholders as
too costly.14
Notwithstanding the above, interesting business opportunities for the
insurance and reinsurance industry are generated by a growing demand for
coverage in a riskier environment.15 It is generally recognized, in fact, that
the insurance and reinsurance industries are a lever of economic
development and have developed substantial expertise in risk management.
Therefore, they will play a critical role in addressing global challenges such
as those posed by climate change and extreme weather events.

14. See, e.g., C.F. Camerer & H.C. Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability
Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565-92 (1989).
15. Andrew Dlugolecki, Climate Change and the Insurance Sector, 33 THE GENEVA
PAPERS ON RISK & INS. ISSUES 71–90 (2008); Arthur Charpentier, Insurability of Climate
Risks, 33 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. ISSUES 91-109 (2008); EVAN MILLS & EUGENE
LECOMTE, FROM RISK TO OPPORTUNITY: HOW INSURERS CAN PROACTIVELY AND PROFITABLY
MANAGE CLIMATE CHANGE (CERES 2006); ASS’N OF BRITISH INSURERS [ABI], FINANCIAL RISKS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE (ABI 2005).
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In the context of an implicit or explicit coordination scheme involving
the public and private sectors, the insurance and reinsurance industry can
contribute significant technical expertise, operational capabilities and
financial capacity in various phases of the disaster risk management
process.
Examples of such expertise and capabilities include: risk
assessment, risk spreading, investment, and management of assets covering
technical provisions, claims handling, and loss adjustment.
The availability of accurate disaster risk models, and the ability of the
insurance industry to process claims arising out of a catastrophic event in an
expedited manner, often turn out to be crucial elements in the success of
the coordination schemes. The efficiency of a system providing voluntary or
compulsory insurance coverage against disasters, in fact, largely depends on
the professional expertise of insurance companies both in the underwriting
and in the claims-handling phases. In several OECD countries, the private
insurance sector has developed the requisite technical expertise for
providing proper risk assessment and risk allocation mechanisms, rapid loss
adjustment services, and effective incentives to reduce risk exposure.
The compensation of disaster losses through risk-based insurance
policies is self-funded from premiums received. This mechanism makes
insurance a reliable financial tool for managing and funding risk, because
the insurance industry specializes in reserving and investing collected funds
for the purpose of claims payment. With respect to natural catastrophe risk,
a private insurance-based mechanism is more likely to have funds to cover
losses over time than an ex post governmental aid disaster program, which
may have to compete for funding with other programs that are subject to
changes in the political climate. The solid experience of the private
insurance sector in assessing risks and adjusting losses, moreover, may offer
great advantages. Efficient and expedited claims settlement practices may
lead to socially beneficial results. Risk-based insurance may be able to
provide additional precautionary incentives for policyholders, through the
mechanism of private surrogate regulation.
Governments in OECD countries have sometimes encouraged the use
of private-sector insurance capacity by adopting regulatory, accounting, and
fiscal measures concerning, for instance: the introduction of a mandatory or
quasi-mandatory disaster insurance regime; the fiscal treatment of disaster
insurance premiums, with a view to providing incentives to purchase
coverage, and the possibility for insurance companies to establish taxdeductible reserve funds for catastrophic risk. The aim of such policies is to
stimulate both the demand and the supply side in order to facilitate the
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financial coverage of catastrophic risks by financial institutions and other
private-sector participants.16
In Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey, for instance, the private insurance
sector actively cooperates with the public sector in the context of explicit
coordination schemes. In some OECD countries, the role of the private
insurance sector in the financial coverage of losses due to natural
catastrophes and extreme weather events is currently under scrutiny, to a
greater or lesser extent.
In several countries, insurance companies, either individually or
through their industry associations, have also launched various initiatives
aimed at raising public awareness of natural disaster risks and how to
prevent or mitigate loss. These measures range from the publication of
reports, studies, newsletters and brochures, to educational programs in
schools (Japan), to the development of publicly accessible risk zoning
models (Austria), to the provision of early warning systems (Germany). In
Canada, the insurance industry founded, in 1998, the Institute for
Catastrophic Loss Reduction, an independent, not-for-profit centre for
multidisciplinary disaster prevention research, and the P&C insurance
industry association is also actively involved in promoting prevention and
mitigation. In the United States, private insurers support the Institute for
Business and Home Safety, which conducts a wide variety of research and
communications on building-related safety issues, and the Insurance
Information Institute, which provides safety messages to the public.
If the insurance industry is called upon to play a central role in the
financial management of large-scale natural disasters, then it is very
important to make sure that insurance and reinsurance companies are able
to perform the assigned tasks effectively. In this respect, the following areas
deserve special attention:
•

Solvency of insurance undertakings. The setting and enforcement
of appropriate solvency standards are crucial to avoiding a
large number of insolvencies among insurance firms in case
of a disaster event. Catastrophe insurance requires access
to very large capital resources and a very high level of
capital allocation. If the insurance sector capital base is not
sufficient to support high catastrophe risk retentions,
reinsurance or alternative risk transfer tools (ARTs) become
necessary. Insurance regulators and supervisors, therefore,

16. Information in this and subsequent paragraphs is derived from data
provided by several countries that responded to an OECD questionnaire survey. See
Monti, supra note 7.
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should carefully monitor insurers’ catastrophe reinsurance
and ART arrangements.
• Business continuity and crisis management plans. The providers of
insurance services must be able to withstand a disaster
event, not only financially, but also from an operational
viewpoint. As a consequence, insurance supervisors should
check disaster preparedness and crisis management plans
of insurance companies, in order to assess their ability to
promptly and efficiently perform all the necessary services
(e.g., loss adjusting, claims management, claims payment)
in the aftermath of a disaster event.
• Claims management practices. Insurance supervisors should
closely monitor claims management practices to ensure
that disaster insurance claims are processed in a timely,
fair, and efficient manner.
In the context of explicit coordination schemes with the insurance
industry, some OECD governments have also decided to offer special
reinsurance arrangements, dedicated lending facilities or other forms of
backstops or guarantees to limit private sector exposure in case of
catastrophic losses.
Where OECD governments have elected to make a financial commitment,
they have acted, directly or through a special purpose entity, as:
• Primary insurer: The government acts as an insurer by
providing insurance and responding to claims either to the
fullest or up to a certain limit. Sometimes the private
insurance sector contributes to the scheme by providing
some operational capabilities (such as marketing and
premium collection).
• Reinsurer of last resort: The government protects the insurance
sector by offering special reinsurance arrangements.
Government-sponsored reinsurance programs may be
mandatory or optional for primary carriers.
• Backstop liquidity provider: The government provides liquidity
to the insurers incurring payout burdens or losses due to a
catastrophic event by means of a pre-arranged contingent
loan facility.
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• Guarantor: The government guarantees that any special
purpose entity, pool or fund created to cover catastrophic
risks will meet all its obligations.
Special risk-sharing agreements between the private and public
sectors, mixing the above features, have also been implemented in some
countries.
The government’s decision to play an active role in disaster risk
transfer schemes by making an ex ante commitment of financial resources is
often linked with the resolution to introduce a mandatory or quasimandatory catastrophe insurance regime. The mandatory nature of the
disaster insurance scheme is often cited as a key component of several
institutional arrangements implemented in OECD countries. However, one
must clarify the meaning of “mandatory” under a scheme. Some countries
have made the purchase of catastrophe insurance coverage mandatory.
Others have simply required insurance companies to make catastrophe
insurance available, by introducing a mandatory offer of coverage that can
be declined by the policyholder. In a number of countries, moreover, fire or
other first party insurance policies are marketed on a voluntary basis, but
insurance companies are required by law to include coverage for
catastrophic risks in such policies: This is the case, for instance, in Belgium,
France, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland.17 In this respect, it is important to
note that different levels of compulsion reflect different policy objectives
and market conditions, and have different advantages and disadvantages.
The mandatory offer of catastrophe insurance is consistent with the
goal of ensuring that disaster coverage is available on the market, so that
businesses and individuals who are willing to purchase financial protection
can do so. However, low risk awareness or cognitive biases that may affect
the demand side could lead to sub-optimal take-up rates, since prospective
policyholders, who are not obliged to purchase catastrophe coverage, would
not be able to make rational decisions. As a result, there could be several
individuals who realize too late that they made the “wrong” decision when
they elected not to purchase coverage. Moreover, if the penetration rate
remains very low, this may generate insufficient risk pooling.
The mandatory purchase of catastrophe insurance is consistent with
the objective of making sure that all those exposed to disaster risks, willing
or unwilling, are covered by insurance, at least up to a certain extent. While
this option – assuming that an effective enforcement mechanism is in
place – ensures widespread diffusion of catastrophic risk coverage, it may be
unpopular. It is, in fact, paternalistic, in the sense that it limits private
autonomy, forcing everyone to purchase coverage. Such a choice may be
justified not only by the above mentioned constraints to rational decision

17. With the exception of the cantons of Schwyz, Uri, and Obwalden, where fire
and natural perils coverage is mandatory.
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making but also by the risk of negative externalities (i.e., situations when
individual’s actions impose costs on others which are not reflected in the
private cost function of the agent) and/or opportunistic behaviors. It may be
argued, for instance, that the individual decision not to purchase financial
protection against catastrophes ex ante imposes costs on the society as a
whole (i.e., social costs), in terms of required post-disaster aid and/or
negative macroeconomic consequences. More generally, this policy choice
becomes less unpopular if the government is able to explain how, when
compared to other mechanisms to compensate for disaster losses, a
mandatory disaster insurance scheme can save taxpayers’ money. To
facilitate public acceptance of this option, it could also be explained that
risk-based disaster insurance – when correctly priced, affordable, and linked
to actionable measures by policyholders – provides financial incentives to
encourage investment in cost-effective mitigation measures to reduce
vulnerability and, as a consequence, contributes to the reduction of the
social costs of disasters.
The mandatory inclusion of catastrophe coverage in basic property
insurance policies (e.g., fire, homeowners, motor) marketed on a voluntary basis
can be effective if the penetration rate of such basic policies is relatively high, so
that they are used as a “vehicle” to spread catastrophe insurance coverage
among businesses and individuals. Compared to the mandatory purchase of
catastrophe insurance, this option entails a lower extent of compulsion and
may, therefore, be less unpopular. However, it may have negative effects on the
market for the basic property policy to which the mandatory catastrophe
extension applies. First, there is a risk that those who do not perceive the
benefits of disaster insurance, or who are rationally unwilling to purchase it,
may decide to drop the basic property coverage due to the increased cost of the
“package.” It should nevertheless be noted that in some countries the
widespread diffusion of basic property policies is due to a requirement imposed
by mortgage lenders, so that the decision to drop all insurance coverage would
be inhibited by such private commitment. Second, tying different insurance
products together (e.g., fire insurance and flood insurance) may distort
competition, since policyholders would be forced to choose the same insurance
company for the coverage of both risks. This, of course, becomes problematic
only if the price, terms and conditions of the compulsory extension of coverage
are not mandated by the law.
Concerning the different types of public sector ex ante financial
commitments in disaster risk transfer, it should be noted that:
• The policy choice to provide primary insurance coverage
against disaster risks may be dictated by the fact that the
private insurance sector is unwilling and/or unable to
provide any coverage. Private-sector operational capacity, if
available and cost-convenient, may be used to perform
such functions as marketing, premium collection and
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claims handling. This option, however, may crowd out
competition from the private sector and in the long run
discourage adaptation in insurance markets or limit the
attractiveness of insurance markets for new investment.
• The option to provide special reinsurance arrangements is
aimed at limiting private sector exposure to peak risks. This
solution may be justified if the primary insurance carriers are
able to retain a portion of the risk, but there is not enough
reinsurance capacity on the private market to provide the
required stop loss arrangements. The provision of such a
limitation to private-sector exposure may also be part of an
institutional arrangement in which mandatory offer, purchase,
or extension of disaster risk coverage is introduced by law. In
this respect, this option may be aimed at protecting the
insurers’ solvency and, therefore, the effectiveness of the
whole system. Depending on the extent of compulsion,
pricing, terms, and conditions of the reinsurance
arrangements provided by the government, this policy option
may crowd out private-sector reinsurance capacity, limit the
scope for innovation, and inhibit the development of
alternative risk transfer (ART) solutions to cover peak risks.
• The choice to act as a backstop liquidity provider, for example
by offering a pre-arranged contingent loan facility to insurance
companies writing disaster risks, is aimed at helping insurers
to smooth catastrophe losses over time. In other words, in this
scenario private insurance and reinsurance companies retain
the ultimate risk, but they benefit from a more convenient
inter-temporal flow of funds. This allows private sector
participants to gradually adjust the pricing of coverage over
time and alleviates the financial problems associated with the
inter-temporal mismatch between the size of annual
premiums and the size of the annual expected losses.
Depending on the pricing, terms, and conditions of the
backstop liquidity arrangements provided by the government,
this option may crowd out capital market solutions, limit the
scope for innovation, and hinder the development of privatemarket alternative risk financing (ARF) tools.
The potential crowding out effects, inherent to each of the different
options outlined above, may be avoided by periodic assessments of market
conditions.
Individual insurance schemes and insurance markets adopt different
approaches to the pricing of weather-related risks. While some coordination
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schemes apply a risk-based pricing mechanism, others have opted for flat
pricing, invoking the principle of solidarity. In any case, it is important to
recognize the impact of risk differentials across the territory of a country or
region and to incorporate such risk differentials in the pricing mechanism,
with a view to providing proper incentives to those most exposed to risk,
while keeping coverage affordable and pricing manageable.
Risk zoning is used for pricing purposes by private insurers in the
Czech Republic, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, and the United States, and
its use is now also considered in Austria, Belgium, and Poland. In the United
States, moreover, premiums are heavily based on the prior claims
experience of the insured, and discounts are available for installing specified
equipment such as storm shutters, wind-resistant glass and fire suppression
systems. Risk-based pricing is also adopted by British insurers to cover flood
risks.
In France, on the other hand, pursuant to the applicable legislative
provisions, pricing of insurance against natural catastrophes is based on a
fixed percentage of the basic premium charged for the underlying property
insurance policy, without specific risk differentials. As a result of a change in
the Spanish scheme, the Consorcio’s surcharge for property and business
interruption coverage (with the exception of property coverage for motor
vehicles, whose price is set at a fixed amount per vehicle) is now calculated
as percentage of the sum insured, instead of being a fixed percentage of the
base premium.
Flat rates are easy to administer and, if coupled with mandatory
insurance, may be an effective mechanism to cross-subsidise the cost of
insurance across the insured pool, which is consistent with the principle of
solidarity. However, this option entails moral hazard and reduces the
incentives to adopt cost-effective risk prevention and mitigation measures.
Deductibles and coinsurance may help cope with moral hazard, but may not
be sufficient. Risk-based deductibles, nevertheless, may be a possible
alternative to risk-based premiums, even if the incentive mechanism is
different insofar as the reward for the adoption of risk-reduction measures
(i.e., a lower deductible in case of future losses instead of a lower premium
at renewal) may be perceived as too distant in time and/or uncertain by the
policyholder.
Risk-based disaster insurance, if correctly priced and linked to
actionable measures by policyholders, can not only provide coverage against
damage – permitting more rapid economic and social recovery – but also
alerts individuals to the hazards they face and creates financial incentives to
encourage investment in cost-effective mitigation measures to reduce
vulnerability. It should be noted, nevertheless, that approaches to pricing
may need to be more pragmatic in disaster insurance schemes than would
normally be the case if the schemes are to be effective and sustainable in
the long run. Nevertheless, risk management incentives should be
encouraged.
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In recent years, the transfer of the higher layers of disaster risks (peak
risks) to capital markets has also been considered by public and private
sector participants in the context of an integrated catastrophe risk
management strategy. Capital markets, in fact, may provide an additional
source of funding and financial capacity to absorb catastrophic risks,
including risks associated with climate change. The worldwide market for
catastrophe bonds (cat bonds) and other insurance-linked securities (ILS) is
relatively young, since it started in the late nineties, but it is constantly
growing. According to available data,18 2007 was another record year, with
total new issues in the amount of US$7 billion (US$4.69 billion in 2006;
US$1.99 billion in 2005; US$1.14 billion in 2004; US$1.73 billion in 2003). A
cat bond is a high-yield bond that contains a provision that may cause the
principal or interest payments to be delayed or lost to the investors in the
event of a specified triggering (catastrophic) event (e.g., a hurricane, a
flood). The cat bond, issued by a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and sold to
institutional investors, provides the sponsor with fully collateralized multiyear cover for well-defined risks on an excess of loss basis and serves as an
alternative or complement to traditional reinsurance.
The emergence of new trigger types,19 new sponsors20 – including
sovereign sponsors – and an increased use of shelf offerings that allow more

18. “With USD7 billion in publicly disclosed issuances for the year, 2007 was by far the most
active year in history of the catastrophe bond market. Record-setting years are becoming
commonplace, as this is the third year in a row in which a new issuance record was established. Cat
bond issuance volume for 2007 increased by 49 percent over the 2006 record of US$4.7 billion and
251 percent over the 2005 record of US$2 billion. The 27 transactions completed exceeded the 20
closed in 2006 and nearly tripled the 10 placed in 2005.” GUY CARPENTER, THE CATASTROPHE
BOND MARKET AT YEAR-END 2007, 5 (MMC Sec. Corp. 2008). Concerning 2006, Guy
Carpenter reported that: “(a)cross nearly all measurable dimensions, including the number of
issuances, total risk capital issued, total risk capital outstanding, number of perils securitized,
diversity of trigger type and offering structure, activity exceeded all previous annual records, generally
by a large margin.” GUY CARPENTER, THE CATASTROPHE BOND MARKET AT YEAR-END 2006, 3
(MMC Sec. Corp. 2007).
19. The trigger on ILS and weather derivatives determines the conditions under
which payments are made to the sponsor. The most important trigger types are: (a)
indemnity (the payouts depend on the sponsors actual losses); (b) index (the
payouts are triggered by the industry loss estimated by an agency that collates such
information for CAT events); (c) parametric (the payouts are determined by well
defined parameters of a CAT event); (d) model (the payouts are triggered by a model
industry loss that is determined by running the actual event parameters through a
modeling firm’s database of industry exposures); (e) hybrid (the payouts are
determined by a combination of two or more existing trigger types).
20. Not only insurance/reinsurance companies, but also other corporate
entities as well as governments now sponsor these transactions. During 2006 two
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flexibility and lower costs, have been witnessed in recent years.21 A growing
securitization activity in non-bond form, such as sidecars, Industry Loss
Warranties (ILWs) and other vehicles was also recorded.22
Since modern catastrophe risk securitization transactions inevitably
entail some degree of basis risk (i.e., the risk associated with imperfect
hedging of the underlying losses), it becomes crucial to determine the
objectives pursued by the sponsor. In May 2006, for instance, the Mexican
government issued a parametric catastrophe bond to cover certain financial
consequences of catastrophic earthquake risks. The transaction provides
catastrophe cover, up to US$160 million, to the Mexican government for
financing emergency costs if an earthquake of magnitude 7.5 or 8 hits
regions near Mexico City or along the Pacific Coast. The cat bond was sold
to institutional investors in the United States and in Europe and it was part
of a larger transaction combining securitization and reinsurance instruments
to the benefit of FONDEN.23 The catastrophe bond issued on behalf the
government of Mexico is mainly aimed at providing the necessary liquidity
for emergency response measures, not at covering the losses caused by a
severe earthquake. A similar objective is pursued by the Caribbean
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF),24 launched under the auspices
of the World Bank, which allows Caribbean governments to purchase
parametric insurance coverage that will provide them with an immediate
cash payment after the occurrence of a major hazard event, thus enabling
them to overcome the liquidity crunch that may follow a disaster and start
recovery operations without delays.
In a number of emerging countries, innovative capital market
solutions, including multi-country, multi-peril catastrophe bonds have been
recently considered to cover the cost of emergency relief measures and
damages to public infrastructures and lifelines due to a disaster. In most
OECD countries, however, there has been, to date, little or no use of ARTs to
cover disaster risks.

catastrophe bond transactions were sponsored by non-insurance entities, the first by
FONDEN, a facility created by the government of Mexico (earthquake risk), the
second by Dominion Resources Inc., a U.S.-based energy company.
21. A shelf offering is a structure that, after the initial offering, allows sponsors
to issue additional notes of a similar risk profile with abbreviated offering
documents, on an as-needed basis throughout a transaction risk period.
22. SWISS RE, SIGMA NO. 7/2006, NEW OPPORTUNITIES
(Swiss Reinsurance Co. 2006).

FOR INSURERS AND INVESTORS

23. See SWISS RE, DISASTER RISK FINANCING: REDUCING
BUDGETS (Swiss Reinsurance Co. 2008).

THE

BURDEN ON PUBLIC

24. See http://www.ccrif.org/
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In Europe, the Reinsurance Directive25 recently enabled member state
regulators to establish a softer regulatory regime for insurance special
purpose vehicles (ISPVs). Domestic incorporated and unincorporated ISPVs
should greatly simplify insurance securitization structures and provide an
attractive legal framework for insurance risk securitizations. The
transposition of this Directive in the domestic legislation of E.U. member
countries is, therefore, expected to facilitate the development of the use of
insurance-linked securities to transfer catastrophic risk exposures to capital
markets,26 also in anticipation of Solvency II.27

4. Conclusion
In a changing risk scenario, insurance, reinsurance and financial sector
participants can play an important role in the financial management of
disaster risks associated with global warming, both in developed and
developing countries.

25. Council Directive 2005/68/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 323) 1-50 (EU).
26. In Germany, for instance, the existing regulation on solvency margins
(Kapitalausstattungsverordnung) has been amended to allow the commitments by
regulated ISPVs to count against the reserves of an insurer in the same way as claims
under a reinsurance would be counted.
27. Solvency II is the European Commission’s planned reform of prudential
regulation for European insurers. It will be a risk-based, forward-looking regulatory regime
founded on a market-consistent approach. Companies will be encouraged and given
incentives to run their business with an increased focus on risk, governance and further
transparency through disclosure. The European Commission published its formal draft
proposal for a Framework Directive on 10th July 2007 and the text is currently being
discussed in Council and Parliament. Solvency II is based on a three pillar approach which is
similar to the banking sector (Basle 2) but adapted for insurance. The first pillar contains
the quantitative requirements. There are two capital requirements, the Solvency Capital
Requirement (SCR) and the Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR), which represent
different levels of supervisory intervention. The SCR is a risk-based requirement and the key
solvency control level. Solvency II sets out two methods for the calculation of the SCR: the
European Standard Formula or firms' own internal models. The SCR will cover all the
quantifiable risks an insurer or reinsurer faces and takes into account of any risk mitigation
techniques. The MCR is a lower requirement and its breach triggers the ultimate supervisory
intervention: the withdrawal of authorisation. The second pillar contains qualitative
requirements on undertakings such as risk management as well as supervisory activities.
The third pillar covers supervisory reporting and disclosure. Firms will need to disclose
certain information publicly, which will bring in market discipline and help to ensure the
stability of insurers and reinsurers (disclosure). In addition, firms will be required to report
greater amount of information to their supervisors (supervisory reporting).
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In developed countries, there are great advantages to having an
operational private insurance/reinsurance industry. First, the insurance and
reinsurance markets may be able to absorb some catastrophe risk that
would otherwise fall on the government. Second, even if there is no
sufficient financial capacity in the market to provide meaningful protection,
the administrative resources of the private insurance industry can provide a
platform for establishing a government-funded and -directed program. In
this respect, insurance companies can perform key services such as
marketing of the policies, premium collection, loss adjustment and claim
payment.28
In emerging economies, the private insurance market is still very often
underdeveloped. The cost of insurance in such economies can be an
impediment to growth of the sector. In consideration of the above,
alternative risk sharing, risk financing and risk transfer tools, such as microinsurance solutions at community level, or parametric coverage purchased
directly by the government to obtain the necessary liquidity for emergency
response measures in case of a disaster, may be more appropriate and
easier to implement. Micro-insurance is the protection of low-income
people against specific perils in exchange for the payment of premiums
proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risk transferred. Generally
speaking, micro-insurance is for persons ignored by the mainstream
commercial and social insurance schemes and it can be delivered through
community-based schemes, credit unions and other micro finance
institutions, as well as major multinational insurance providers.29 Indexbased financial risk transfer mechanisms, such as index-based climate
insurance, provide viable market-based solutions to the risks posed by
extreme weather risks and can help climate change adaptation, especially
for the poorer layers of society.
From a normative perspective, a clear and transparent allocation of
risks and responsibilities among public authorities, firms and individuals
emerges as a key component of effective coordination schemes, and a driver
to the success of any catastrophe risk management program. Another critical
element is the ability to link policy tools (i.e., the technical features of a
coordination scheme) with the underlying policy objectives pursued by the
government, such as providing adequate financial protection to all
individuals and entities, or simply making coverage available. In any case,
financial management strategies should primarily focus on promoting
techniques of prevention, adaptation, and mitigation.
In those systems that rely on insurance solutions to compensate for
property losses due to catastrophes, the level of disaster insurance

28. See POL’Y ISSUES IN INS. NO.8 (OECD Publishing 2005)
29. See PROTECTING THE POOR 12-13 (Craig Churchill ed., Int’l Labour Org. [ILO] in
association with Munich Re Found. 2006).
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penetration often remains a key concern. Even if disaster insurance coverage
is made compulsory by operation of law, the enforcement of the regime may
prove to be very difficult, especially if there is a lack of insurance culture
among the population. Promoting disaster risk awareness and educating the
population to the financial consequences of large-scale disasters becomes,
therefore, extremely important.
In general, the challenge is to identify financial solutions that provide
the right incentives to invest in cost-effective preventive measures with a
view to reducing vulnerability and the total cost of disasters. The total cost
of disasters is the sum of the cost of disaster losses (insured and
uninsured), the cost of preventive measures to avoid or mitigate disaster
losses, and transaction costs (i.e., the costs of implementing the scheme).30
On the other hand, it is important to bear in mind that public and private
investments in disaster risk reduction and mitigation measures, by limiting
exposure and vulnerability to disaster risks, facilitate the development of
new risk financing, risk sharing and risk transfer tools. In light of the above,
it becomes clear that disaster risk reduction, mitigation and financing efforts
are closely linked to one another, and should be carefully coordinated by
policymakers.

30. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
(Yale Univ. Press 1970).
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